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OBJECTIVES 
Recent research has shown that false memories can have a positive consequence on human 
cognition in both children and young adults. The present experiment investigated whether 
false memories could have similar positive effects by priming solutions to insight-based 
problems in healthy older adults and people with Alzheimer’s disease.  
METHODS 
Participants were asked to solve compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, half of 
which had been preceded by the presentation of Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists 
whose critical lures were also the solutions to those problems.  
RESULTS 
The results showed that regardless of cognitive ability, when the critical lure was falsely 
recognized, CRAT problems were solved more often and reliably faster than problems that 
were not primed by a DRM list. When the critical lure was not falsely recognized, CRAT 
problem solution rates and times were no different from when there was no DRM priming.  
DISCUSSION 
These findings are consistent with predictions from theories of associative activation and 
demonstrate the importance of automatic spreading activation processes in memory across 
the lifespan. 
 
Key words: False memory, Priming problem solving, Compound remote associates task, 
DRM paradigm, Alzheimer’s disease 
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Can False Memories Prime Problem Solutions for Healthy Older Adults and 
those with Alzheimer’s Disease?  
 
Alzheimer’s disease is characterised by a progressive deterioration of cognitive functioning, 
and memory disorders are considered to be the earliest and the more serious clinical 
symptoms of this disease. At the beginning of the disease people with AD commonly exhibit 
impairments in episodic memory and rapidly forget newly learned information (Baudic, 
Tzortzis &  Barba, 2004). However, numerous neuropsychological studies have reported 
evidence that semantic memory impairment may occur relatively early in the course of 
Alzheimer’s disease. For example, people with AD retrieve fewer items from a given 
semantic or letter category on timed verbal fluency tasks (Ober, Dronkers, Koss, Delis, & 
Friedland, 1986) and perform more poorly on object naming tasks, particularly those 
involving less common objects with lower frequency names (Kirshner, Webb, & Kelly, 
1984).  Despite the unequivocal evidence of semantic deficits in Alzheimer’s disease, a 
controversy remains as to whether the semantic deficit stems from a loss of information in the 
semantic store (Chertkow, Bub & Seidenberg, 1989), or whether the store of semantic 
memory remains intact in Alzheimer’s disease, and the deficit is related to a disturbance in an 
Alzheimer’s disease patient’s ability to access and manipulate semantic information (Nebes, 
1989). 
The semantic priming paradigm has been used to look at changes in semantic memory 
in Alzheimer’s disease. Most studies of semantic priming use a lexical decision task. The 
lexical decision task is a computerized task composed of a number of trials, each of which is 
composed of two events: a prime and a target. The prime is often a word for which no 
response is required.  Later, when the target appears on the screen, the participant has to 
decide as quickly and accurately as possible if it is a real word (e.g., chair) or not (e.g., ignul). 
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The temporal interval between the presentation of the prime and the presentation of the target 
is called the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). The SOA ideally is short, from a few tens to a 
few hundreds of milliseconds. When the targets are words, a few of them share a semantic 
relationship with the prime (e.g., the prime “table” followed by the target “chair”), whereas 
the others are not related to the prime (elephant-table). The priming effect correspond to the 
reduction of the response time or the percentage of errors in the trials where the prime and the 
target are related compared to those where the words do not share a semantic relationship.  
Semantic priming effects are generally viewed within the framework of automatic 
spreading activation in the semantic network. That is, the related prime word activates the 
subsequently presented target word through their associative links in semantic memory (e.g., 
Collins & Loftus, 1975). Thus, the presentation of a prime automatically activates related 
nodes, increasing their accessibility. Therefore, when the prime and target are related, the 
target word is likely to have received this prior activation and will be recognized more 
quickly and accurately. This automatic pre-activation of the related words in the semantic 
network is the cause of the observed facilitation.  
Semantic priming effects have been investigated in patients with Alzheimer’s disease, 
with conflicting results. For example, some researchers have found less-than-normal priming 
(Ober & Shenaut, 1988), other studies report equivalent priming for Alzheimer’s disease 
patients and healthy older adults, with researchers concluding that semantic memory 
structures are relatively intact in people with AD (Balota & Duchek, 1991; Chertkow et al., 
1989, 1994; ; Nebes et al., 1989). Some studies have reported a combination of no priming 
and normal priming effects (Albert & Milberg, 1989), other studies have reported both 
normal priming and hyperpriming (greater than normal priming) with researchers concluding 
either that attentional abnormalities play a role in performance on semantic priming tasks 
(Hartman, 1991) or that degradation of the semantic network is responsible, where degraded 
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concepts have more to gain from spread of activation than non-degraded concepts (e.g. 
Chertkow, Bub, & Seidenberg, 1989).  
In addition to semantic and episodic deficits, people with AD exhibit a higher 
incidence of memory distortions compared to their cognitively healthy older peers. These 
memory distortions can be severe, such as confabulation (Nedjam, Devouch, & Dalla Barba, 
2004), though generally they are more mundane. For example, people with AD may have 
thought that they had turned off their stove when they simply misremembered that they 
turned off the stove. Organizational strategies, such as using pillboxes for medication, can 
help in the remembering of daily living activities. However, this type of strategy does not 
help when people with AD experience false memories – not looking in their pillbox, for 
example, because they falsely remember taking their medication.  
  The Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995) is probably the most popular and commonly used paradigm to study false 
memories in a laboratory setting. Here, participants are presented with a list of words all of 
which are associatively related (e.g., table, sit, legs) and are also associated with a critical 
lure (CL) word that is never presented (i.e., chair). When memory is subsequently tested 
using recall or recognition tasks, healthy participants show a tendency to falsely recall and 
recognize the CLs as having been presented on the list (Balota, Cortese, Duchek, Adams, 
Roediger, McDermott, & Yerys, 1999; McDermott, 1999). 
Several studies have used the DRM paradigm with AD people and shown that they 
tend to produce fewer CLs than control participants (e.g., Balota et al., 1999; Budson, 
Sullivan, Mayer, Daffner, Black & Schacter, 2002; Gallo, Bell, Beier & Schacter, 2006; 
Waldie & Kwong See, 2003), although the reverse has also been observed (see Watson, 
Balota, & Sergent-Marshall, 2001). Some studies have shown no reliable differences in CL 
production in people with AD and healthy controls (Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001). 
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There are a number of theories that can explain the lower production of CLs in people 
with AD. The activation-monitoring theory (see Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 
2001) is one of the more dominant explanations (see Gallo 2010 for a review). According to 
this theory, false memories arise due to two distinct processes: an activation process and a 
source-monitoring process. For example, in the DRM task, because the presentation of each 
of the lists of words automatically activates the related but unpresented CL, the CL is 
activated multiple times via an automatic spread of activation within the associative network. 
The sum of this activation increases the feeling of familiarity for this item, while 
simultaneously reducing the ability to remember the source of its activation (source-
monitoring process). Thus, the production of the CL may result from its erroneous attribution 
to an external source. In healthy aging, any increase in false memories is often explained by a 
source-monitoring failure (Schacter et al., 1997).  
The activation-monitoring theory can also be used as a framework to explain the low 
production of CLs in people with AD in the DRM task. Several studies have reported a 
failure of the source-monitoring process in AD people (Rosa, Deason, Budson, & Gutchess, 
2015). Thus, it seems implausible to attribute their lower production of CLs, compared with 
healthy older adults, to a more efficient source monitoring. Budson, Daffner, Desikan, and 
Schacter (2000) and later Gallo (2010) proposed that the activation of target items in people 
with AD during the presentation of the DRM lists does not spread toward the CL, due either 
to a disturbance of the semantic network or an attentional overload. Therefore, if the CL has 
not been activated during list presentation, the CL could not later be falsely remembered. 
However, Evrard, Colombel, Gilet, and Corson (2015) suggested that the activation of the CL 
is preserved in people with AD, but that its mnemonic trace does not persist long enough in 
memory to enable its later production, due to a decline in episodic memory.  
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By way of summary then, healthy older adults and those with AD both experience 
declines in episodic memory. However, semantic memory is thought to be better preserved in 
healthy older adults than it is in those with AD. Thus, on the one hand, differences between 
these groups in false memory production may be mediated more by differences in semantic 
than episodic memory (Madore, Addis, & Schacter 2015; Madore, Jing, & Schacter 2016). 
That is, perhaps people with AD experience greater difficulty than their healthy counterparts 
with associative activation of related information within semantic networks (Budson et al., 
2000; Dewhurst, Thorley, Hammond, & Ormerod, 2011; Gallo et al., 2006). On the other 
hand, perhaps the CL does get activated, but the time course for the decline in this activation 
is faster for those with AD than those without. 
One way to test these proposals is to introduce a second task where performance 
improvements on that task are predicated on the earlier production of the CL from the DRM 
list presentation. By way of background, there are a number of studies that have found that 
false memories have positive consequences on subsequent task performance.  For example, 
McKone and Murphy (2000) showed that false memories generated using the DRM paradigm 
could prime performance on related memory tasks (e.g., stem-cued recall). Studies like these 
have prompted researchers to examine the possible beneficial effects of false memories on 
cognitive tasks other than those related to memory (Howe, 2011; Schacter, Guerin, & St. 
Jacques, 2011). 
 Howe, Garner, Dewhurst, and Ball (2010) were the first to carry out research 
investigating the role that false memories play in priming insight-based problem solving 
using compound remote associate tasks (CRATs) (see Mednick, 1962; Sio). CRAT problems, 
originally developed by Mednick (1962), involve the presentation of three words (e.g., apple, 
family, and house) and the task is to come up with a word (i.e., tree) which, when combined 
with each of the three original words, creates compound words or common phrases (i.e., 
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apple tree, family tree, treehouse). Howe et al. (2010) presented adults with DRM lists whose 
critical lures served as potential primes for half of the subsequent CRAT problems that 
participants had to solve. They found that when participants falsely recalled the CLs of the 
studied DRM lists, the corresponding CRATs were solved more frequently and significantly 
faster than CRATs that had not been primed or cases in which DRM lists had been presented 
but CLs were not falsely remembered. Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, and Knott (2011) 
extended this research to children and found exactly the same results. What this research 
shows that like true memories, false memories can successfully prime higher order cognitive 
tasks (i.e., insight-based problem solving). 
 In the current research, we wanted to see whether these priming effects also occur in 
healthy older adults and, more importantly, people with AD.  If this finding can be extended 
to people with AD, this would extend our understanding of memory processes in this sub-
group of memory-impaired people and importantly, could have positive implications for 
memory rehabilitation. If people with AD have greater problems with spreading activation 
than healthy older adults (Budson et al., 2000; Gallo et al., 2006), then they should be less 
likely to remember the CL than healthy older adults. In addition, if false memories have a 
shorter “lifespan” for people with AD, then even when CLs are produced on the memory test, 
priming effects on subsequently administered CRAT problems should be attenuated or 
absent. However, if as some previous research suggests (Roediger et al., 2001) both healthy 
older adults and people with AD do have intact semantic networks and CL longevity is not an 
issue, then it is expected that CLs will be falsely remembered and priming will occur on 
subsequent CRAT problems.  
In the present study, we used CRAT problems whose baseline solution rates were 
moderate (30% to 80%) for older adults.  Because the CRAT norms that are available were 
based on solutions provided by children and young adults, we created our own age-
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appropriate CRAT norms prior to conducting the priming experiment. Our rationale for this 
was that we wanted to eliminate differences of age due simply to knowledge base, a 
procedure consistent with previous studies (e.g., Howe et al., 2011), as these differences were 
not of interest in the current research. 
  
Experiment 1: Norming CRAT Problems for use with Older Adults 
 Before turning to the main experiment, we report a pilot study in which we collected 
norms for CRAT problems for use with older adults. In line with previous research, age-
appropriate CRAT problems were developed in order to eliminate any potential age effects in 
problem-solving performance due to the use of extant norms which were developed using 
samples of children and young adults.  
Method 
Participants. A total of 32 healthy older adults (13 males and 19 females) took part in this 
experiment; their mean age was 78.19 (SD = 5.67). The older adults had normal cognitive 
functioning (as assessed by the Mini Mental State Examination, MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & 
McHugh, 1974) with a mean score of 27.31 (SD = 2.52), normal activities of daily living, and 
most importantly, did not meet diagnostic criteria for dementia. These older adults were 
volunteers who were community dwelling and were tested in their own home or local 
community centre.  
 
Materials. Older adults were presented with 20 CRAT problems taken from the Bowden and 
Jung-Beeman (2003) norms. The items on the CRATs required a solution that was associated 
with all three words of the triad through the construction of a compound word or common 
phrase (e.g., cream, skate, and water combined with the solution word ice, creating the 
compounds ice cream, ice skate, and ice water). (Note that only problems with solution rates 
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above 30% and solved within 30 seconds were selected for subsequent use with older adults 
with AD.) All the solution words had a familiarity rating of 500 or above (with a maximum 
entry of 645 and a mean of 566 (Coltheart, 1981)) and a word frequency of 10 or above (with 
a maximum entry of 686 and a mean of 126 (Kucera & Francis. 1967)). 
 
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. Instructions similar to those 
used by Howe et al. (2011) and by Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003) were given. 
Specifically, participants were told that they would see three words and that they should try 
and produce a fourth word that, when combined with each of the three items, would make up 
a common compound word or phrase. Participants were first given three demonstrations by 
the experimenter followed by two practice problems prior to the experiment itself. The three 
problem words were presented on a computer laptop screen simultaneously in a horizontal 
orientation, with one word above, below, and at the centre fixation point. Participants were 
given 30s to produce the solution (this was a verbal solution). If the solution was produced 
within the time limit, both the solution word and solution time were recorded and the next 
problem was presented. If participants did not produce the correct response within the time 
limit, the solution was provided by the experimenter and the program automatically moved to 
the next problem. 
 
Results 
Table 1 shows the average solution rates and times for the 20 problems separately. As can be 
seen, older adults were able to solve most of these CRAT problems. Importantly, for the next 
experiment, there was a good range of solution rates and times for these CRAT problems. 
What this means is that priming effects, should they exist, can be measured without 
constraints imposed by floor and ceiling effects.  
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Experiment 2: Examining Priming Effects in Older Healthy Adults and those with AD 
With these norms in hand, we now turn to the main question concerning the role of false 
memories in priming solutions to insight-based problem solving in healthy older adults and 
people with AD. 
Method 
Participants. A new sample of 60 participants was recruited whose demographic and other 
characteristics are shown in Table 2. A statistical power analysis was performed for sample 
size estimation. The effect size in this study was considered to be medium using Cohen’s 
(1988) criteria. With an alpha = .05 and power = .80, our sample size of 60 (30 participants 
per group) is considered more than adequate.	  Thirty participants had a clinical diagnosis of 
probable or possible AD (McKhann, Drachman, Folstein, Katzman, Price, & Stadlan 1984). 
Patients were diagnosed as being demented with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, third edition (DSM III-R; American Psychiatric Association, 1987) criteria 
as having Alzheimer’s disease by the National Institute of Neurological and Communicative 
Disorder and Stroke and the Alzheimer ’s disease and Related Disorders Association 
(NINCDS-ADRDA) criteria (McKhann et al., 1984). Alzheimer’s disease was diagnosed by a 
clinician using neuropsychological examination, Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; 
Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), family interview, laboratory screening (i.e.	  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
hematology; B12 and folate levels; renal, liver, and thyroid function; calcium and syphilis 
serology), and medical examination. If there was a suggestion of a psychiatric disorder, 
patients were also assessed by a psychiatrist. Patients with a history of stroke or depression 
were excluded from this study. Patients with a Hachinski score (Hachinski, Zilhka, du 
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Boulay, McAllister, Marshall, Ross, Russell, & Symon, 1975) that indicated they might have 
vascular component to their dementia were also excluded. Thirty participants made up an 
older adult control (OAC) group. These people were community dwelling and were recruited 
from a panel of older adults who had expressed an interest in participating in research (n = 
18), or were recruited from Age Concern London (n = 12). All OAC participants had recently 
been screened for dementia using the MMSE, all scoring above the standard cut-off of 26/30.  
          As noted, the demographic characteristics of the participants are shown in Table 2. 
One-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used to analyze these demographic variables. 
These analyses showed that there were no significant differences between groups in mean 
age, F < 1. There was a significant difference in the National Adult Reading Test (NART) 
predicted IQ scores (Nelson, 1982) for the groups, F(1, 58) = 18.56, p < .001, with the AD 
group scoring reliably lower than the OACs. There was also a significant difference in the 
mean number of years of formal education between groups, F(1, 58) = 12.01, p <. 001, with 
the OACs having reliably more years of formal education. For Mini Mental State 
Examination Score (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), as expected, there was 
also a significant difference between groups, F(1,58) = 56.21, p < .001, with the people with 
AD performing reliably lower that the OACs. In addition, people with AD were also tested 
on the word list memory test from the Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer’s 
Disease CERAD neuropsychology battery (Morris, Edland, Clark, Galasko, Koss, Mohs, & 
Heyman, 1993; Welsh, Butters, Hughes, Mohs, & Heyman, 1991). For delayed recall, they 
recalled an average of 0.8 (SD = 1.92) words. This level of performance on this particular 
task is in keeping with other reports for people with AD in the literature (e.g., Akhtar, 
Moulin, & Bowie, 2006; Moulin, James, Freeman, & Jones, 2004), where mean performance 
is typically less than one for people with AD. Mean normal performance is around six items 
(Moulin et al., 2004).   
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 Older healthy adults gave their written informed consent. For people with AD, 
written informed consent was given either by them or their primary caregivers. The OACs 
were community dwelling and people with AD were recruited from two day-care centres in 
London. All participants were fluent in English. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Design, Materials, and Procedure. A 2 (Group: AD vs. OAC) x 2 (Priming: primed vs. 
unprimed) mixed design was used, where the first factor was between-participants and the 
second was a within-participant factor. For purposes of the analyses, primed items were 
further divided according to whether participants falsely remembered the critical lure 
(designated “primed/FM”) or did not falsely remember the critical lure (designated 
“primed/no-FM”). This resulted in a 2 (Group) x 3 (Priming) design. We followed the same 
procedure as Howe et al. (2010, 2011) such that each participant was primed on half the 
subsequent CRAT problems with preceding DRM lists whose critical lures were also the 
solution to those CRAT problems. The order of both the DRM lists and CRAT problems was 
carefully counterbalanced to eliminate order effects.  
 Ten CRAT problems were selected from the normative data in Experiment 1 (see 
Appendix). Their nonprimed solution rates ranged between 30% and 80% in order to insure 
that they were neither too easy nor too hard. In addition, 10 DRM lists whose CLs were the 
corresponding solutions to these CRATs were selected. Each list contained 10 word 
associates of the critical lure and were taken from Roediger et al. (2001) norms. Lists were 
randomly divided into two groups of five with participants being primed using one of these 
sets. In order to prevent differences in false memory rates, the two sets of five DRM lists 
were equated on backward associative strength (BAS) (List Set 1 BAS = 0.777, List Set 2 
BAS = 0.725). 
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Participants were given one set of the five DRM lists in a randomized order. Each list 
was presented verbally, followed by a distractor task (counting backward by four from a 3-
digit number for 30s). This was followed by a recognition test similar to that in Howe, 
Wilkinson, Garner, and Ball (2016) whereby participants were verbally presented with the 5 
critical lure words from the studied DRM lists, 5 unstudied and unrelated critical lures, 32 
true items from the studied DRM lists, 32 foils unrelated to studied DRM lists, and 8 filler 
items. A recognition test was implemented rather than a recall test to reduce effects of 
priming during retrieval (Olszewska & Ulatowska, 2013). For each word presented in the 
recognition task, participants had to select either [O], indicating that the word was Old and 
that they recognize the word from the previously presented lists, or [N] if they thought the 
current word presented was a new word that they did not hear in the previous word lists. 
Following completion of the DRM lists, all 10 CRAT problems were completed. The same 
procedure used for the CRAT pilot study was used for the main experiment and solution rates 
and solution times were collected for correctly solved CRAT problems.  
Results 
 We controlled for the effects of educational level and NART statistically. In all 
of our analyses, we ran an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with these demographic 
variables as covariates. For all ANCOVAs, the pattern of findings for the main effect of 
group and interactions with group were unchanged from the analysis with ANOVAs. For 
simplicity, therefore, the ANOVAs are reported here.  
 False memories were comparable to previous studies (Roediger, Balota, & 
Watson, 2001; Waldie & Kwong-See, 2003). The recognition task showed that both the 
OACs and people with AD created false memories for the critical lure words, with people 
with AD falsely recognizing the critical lure 61% (M = 3.05, SD = 1.31) of the time and the 
OAC group 60% (M = 3.01, SD = .91) of the time. There were no reliable differences. 
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Overall recognition scores were analyzed using a 2 (Group: AD vs. OAC) x 4 (list type: 
critical lures, unstudied unrelated critical lures, foils and list items) mixed model ANOVA. 
Analysis revealed a significant main effect of list type, F(3, 58) = 6.51, p < .001. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed greater recognition in list items (80%) compared to foil items (66.7%) 
(M = 25.63, SD = 2.51 vs M = 21.34, SD = 3.3) and greater recognition of CL words (60.6%) 
compared to unrelated CL words (40.4%) (M = 3.03, SD = .80 vs M = 2.02, SD = 1.08) . 
There was no main effect for group (F < 1) and no interaction (F < 1). 
Because false alarm rates for recognition tests often require a correction for response 
bias, we analyzed discrimination and response bias scores using signal detection analysis. We 
used the Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) correction for signal detection theory (SDT) 
measures, whereby 0.5 was added to hit and false alarm rates and the corrected score was 
divided by N + 1. This was used in order to prevent values of 1.0 and 0. The Snodgrass and 
Corwin correction was conducted for SDT measures for all list items. For discriminability 
(d’), larger values indicate better memory performance, and for criterion value (C), values 
greater than 0 represent a conservative response bias and less than 0 represents a liberal 
response bias. The values of d’ and C are shown in Table 3. The calculation of d’ and C for  
used the false alarm rate for unrelated foils. Signal detection measures for hits and critical 
lures were analyzed using separate independent t-tests. The analysis of d’ for hits and critical 
lures revealed no reliable differences (t < 1).  Analysis of the criterion C, revealed no reliable 
differences for hits or critical lures (t < 1).  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
 The mean CRAT solution rates (proportions) and the mean CRAT solution 
times (in seconds) were calculated for each participant and analyzed separately in a series of 
2 (Group: AD vs. OAC) x 3 (Priming: primed/FM vs. primed/no-FM vs. unprimed) 
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ANOVAs. For primed CRAT problems, solution rates and solution times were 
conditionalized on whether participants had produced the critical lure during recall (i.e., 
primed/FM = critical lure produced and primed/no-FM = no critical lure produced). Thus, 
both solution rates and solution times were subjected to separate ANOVAs where the factors 
were solution type (unprimed, primed/no-FM, or primed/FM) and group. The data are shown 
in Table 4. 
 Concerning solution times, there was a main effect for priming F(2, 58) =  
15.26, p < .001, η²p = .244, where post hoc tests (Tukey’s LSD) showed that solution times  
were faster for primed/FM problems (M = 21.49) compared to primed/No-FM problems (M = 
38.12, p < .01) and unprimed CRAT problems (M = 38.50, p = < .01), and the latter two 
conditions did not differ. Furthermore, solution time results showed no significant difference 
across participant groups, with OAC’s average problem solving time being 31.39s (SE = 
1.132) and AD’s being 34.09s (SE = 1.519). There was no interaction. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
 Concerning solution rates, there was a main effect for priming F(2, 58) = 15.26, p < 
.001, η²p = .248, where post hoc tests (Tukey’s LSD) showed that solution rates were higher 
for primed/FM CRAT problems (M = 0.52) than for primed/no-FM (M = 0.23) and when 
participants were unprimed (M = 0.26), and the latter two did not differ. There was no main 
effect for group, where OACs (M = 0.42) and AD (M = 0.39) solved similar numbers of 
CRAT problems and no interaction. 
Discussion 
The present study set out to investigate whether false memories can have a positive 
consequence on human cognition with older healthy adults and those with AD, as has been 
shown in children and young adults (Howe et al., 2010, 2011). To investigate this, 
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participants were asked to solve CRAT problems, half of which had been preceded by the 
presentation of DRM lists whose critical lures were also the solutions to those problems.  
Consistent with previous research, our study showed no reliable differences in the number of 
false memories produced in the recognition task (Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001; Waldie 
& Kwong-See, 2003). This finding can be explained by the fact that both older healthy adults 
and those with AD have intact semantic networks that automatically activate CLs upon DRM 
list presentation. Our findings support existing evidence regarding the underlying 
mechanisms in the production of false memories (Roediger et al., 2001). Previous research 
has shown the generation of false memories from the automatic spread of activation within 
the semantic networks and the corresponding activations of word associations. The findings 
from the present study further extend this notion, providing evidence that not only are false 
memories associated with the spreading activation among semantic associates but essentially 
act similarly to true memories when it comes to priming subsequent task performance 
(McDermott, 1997). Furthermore, when a recognition test is administered in this priming 
paradigm, endorsement of the false memory item vs no endorsement is an index of the 
strength of activation of the critical lure in memory. That is, no recognition = below threshold 
activation and recognition = above threshold activation. Although false memories arise at 
encoding, test performance reveals the strength of that activation. It also turns out that 
presenting the critical lure at test has little to no effect on memory strength of the critical lure 
because, as already mentioned, false memories arise during the encoding not retrieval process 
(see Howe et al., 2016, 2017). 
Our findings are the first to show that false memories can successfully prime insight-
based problem solving in both AD and OACs. Just like in Howe et al. (2011) we propose 
when problem solutions were primed by the prior presentation of DRM lists whose critical 
lures were falsely remembered and were solutions to those problems, critically both the 
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probability of such problems being solved and the speed with which they were solved 
improved significantly. This was true regardless of whether the problem solvers were people 
with AD or OACs. These findings strongly suggest that false memories do not “fade” more 
rapidly for people with AD than for OACs and they are capable of priming and facilitating 
performance on a subsequent problem-solving task. What is important to consider here, is the 
DRM lists can prime and facilitate performance on problem-solving tasks both in terms of the 
rate and the speed which they are solved. However, one can only make this conclusion when 
the critical lure is falsely recognised. Such facilitation is not found when the false CL has not 
been remembered. Interestingly, priming with no recognition of the CL resulted in problem-
solving rates and times identical to conditions in which there was no priming. This adds to 
the growing view that false memories, like true memories, can successfully prime higher 
cognitive processes, at least in terms of problems involving insight-based solutions 
(Diliberto-Macaluso, 2005; Howe et al., 2010, 2011, 2016).  
Our research is the first to demonstrate that false memory priming effects occur 
regardless of cognitive abilities. In the present study, priming effects were equally robust in 
OACs and people with AD. This cognitive invariance has important theoretical implications. 
We suggest intact semantic networks exist in both these groups of older adults. To add 
strength to this argument, we compared our findings to previous research with younger adults 
(e.g., Howe et al., 2011, 2016). What this comparison shows is that rates of priming for 
younger adults in those studies is similar to those same rates for the older adults in the present 
study. Specifically, regardless of differences in materials and overall false memory rates, 
when young adults remembered the CL, their priming power for solving subsequent CRAT 
problems was similar to the rate for when older adults got the CL in the present research. 
That is, average solution times for young adults (19.22) was similar to that for older adults 
(21.20) as were the average solution rates for younger adults (0.76) and older adults (0.6). 
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Thus, what our study shows is that semantic networks are relatively well preserved in people 
with AD and OACs, at least when compared to those same rates for younger adults in earlier 
research.  
From all of this research it is clear that false memories generated from the DRM word 
lists and CRAT problem solutions arise from the nonconscious and automatic spreading of 
activation among semantic concepts (Balota et al., 1999; Roediger et al., 2001). Therefore, as 
a result of priming occurring in both of the populations studied here, spreading of activation 
between nodes in the semantic networks must be intact. In the extant literature, decline in 
performance on tasks such as verbal fluency have been attributed to the breakdown in 
semantic networks, particularly for people with AD (Balota et al., 1999; Watson et al., 2001). 
What our findings suggest is that these breakdowns are not due to the deterioration of 
semantic networks but rather, due to possible failures in source monitoring. Although further 
research is needed to confirm this hypothesis, what our study shows is that there was no 
decline in spreading activation within semantic networks; false memories were as frequent in 
people with AD as in those without AD (our OACs) and they served as equally powerful 
primes for both groups when solving CRAT problems. 
Another hypothesis worth considering could be that CRAT problems were solved via 
insight-like (perhaps automatic, nonconscious) strategy or via a more analytic (perhaps 
deliberate) strategy (e.g., Konious 2006; Knonious & Beeman 2009). These studies show that 
distinct brain mechanisms are involved for the two types of solutions. Although in the present 
study there were no differences between OACs and people with AD in using primes for 
solving CRAT problems, the mechanisms through which the two groups of participants 
reached the solution could have differed. Of course, this hypothesis would require additional 
research. 
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Previous research has shown the positive consequences that false memories have on 
problem-solving tasks in both children and adults, yet this has not been fully examined in 
individuals with associated cognitive decline (Howe et al., 2010). The results from the current 
study demonstrate for the first time the priming effects false memories have on complex 
insight-based problem solving tasks such as CRATs on OACs and people with AD. 
Additionally, our findings add to the recent literature on the positive consequences that false 
memories have on human cognition, particularly in the way they facilitate performance on 
higher-order cognitive tasks such as the CRAT. Given that these significant results were 
found in both older adults and people with AD, our findings strongly suggest that significant 
differences that may arise in memory functioning are not the result of deterioration in 
spreading activating in semantic networks, at least not in the DRM/CRAT tasks.  
Finally, our findings have a number of important theoretical and practical 
implications. First, we propose that OACs and people with AD have intact semantic 
networks. Second, although there are clear differences between true and false memories 
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995) our findings add to the growing literature suggesting that 
false memories can work in a very similar way to those observed for true memories 
(Diliberto-Macaluso, 2005). Third, our findings add to an emerging consensus that false 
memories, just like false beliefs (Howe & Derbish, 2010), can have beneficial effects in 
human cognition and not simply the negative consequences we are all familiar with (see 
Howe & Knott, 2015). We are aware some may interpret false memories as negative 
regardless of their benefits as outlined in this paper, we believe that this by-product of a 
powerful reconstructive memory system is positive (see Howe et al., 2010). Our findings 
have taken us a step closer to realizing at least one beneficial aspect of false recollection in 
that it helps to establish that false memories, like true memories, can and do provide 
significant advantages when it comes to more complex cognitive processes, specifically 
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insight-based problem solving for both OACs, people with AD, children, and adults (Howe et 
al., 2011). 
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Table 1 CRAT Problems: Solution Rates and Times 
CRAT Problem 
CRAT 
Solution 
% Solved Solution Time (s) 
Heart/potato/tooth Sweet 18.8 30.2  (12.24) 
Over/deep/Walk Sleep 21.9 23.7  (17.45) 
Skin/ball/tissue Soft 25 13.5  (10.02) 
Bike/top/goat Mountain 34.4 20.1  (17.68) 
Base/tank/territorial Army 40.6 21.3  (18.03) 
Cut/sore/war Cold 43.8 21.9  (18.86) 
Hold/print/stool Foot 43.8 18.6  (13.62) 
List/death/Bone Wish 46.9 19.2  (13.84) 
Polo/flannel/vest Shirt 46.9 24.5  (20.69) 
Bow/Haul/jump Long 53.2 18.6  (16.09) 
Bowl/Juice/Salad Fruit 53.2 11.6  (9.73) 
Measuring/cake/tea Cup 59.4 18.5  (13.97) 
Pal/tip/knife Pen 62.5 14.3  (12.50) 
Bite/vein/web Spider 68.8 17.1  (13.63) 
Jack/magic/board Black 75 13.5  (12.48) 
Crumbs/dough/Knife Bread 81.3 13.4  (12.54) 
Care/spa/mental Health 87 10.2  (7.73) 
Knitting/stick/pine Needle 87.5 16.2  (14.52) 
Sill/frame/cleaner Window 87.6 11.8  (14.09) 
School/Chair/Heels High 90.6 12.8  (13.63) 
Rocking/wheel/high Chair 93.7 9.8   (11.71) 
Note: Standard deviation is in parenthesis and solution times are presented 
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Table 2. Means (and Standard Error) Demographic Characteristics of Participants 
 AD OAC 
MMSE 19.54 (.55) 27.39(.58) 
NART 106.54 (1.79) 116.78(.95) 
Education 10.02 (.27) 12.32 (.42) 
Age 76.43 (1.13) 77.32 (.84) 
Note. MMSE = Mini Mental State Examination Score 
          Predicted IQ from the National Adult Reading Tests 
          Education = Years of formal education. 
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Table 3. Means and Standard deviations of Signal Detection Measures of 
Discriminability (d’) and Bias (C) for Hits and Critical Lures (CL). 
 OAC  AD  
   d'    C d' C 
Hits 1.42 (.48) 0.23 (.2) 1.13 (.39) 0.18 (.1) 
CL 0.93 (.78) 0.22 (.39) 0.84 (.53) 0.18 (.32) 
Note. CL – critical lures 
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Table 4. Mean CRAT problem solution rates and solution times for older adults and 
Alzheimer’s patients for false memory priming 
Participant                                                               Priming 
 Unprimed Priming/FM Priming/NO-FM 
Solution times (seconds) 
Older Adults  36.97 (1.92) 21.20 (1.27) 37.24 (1.61) 
Alzheimer’s Patients  44.06 (2.58) 21.98 (1.72) 39.70 (2.16) 
Solution rates (proportion) 
 
Older Adults  0.38 (0.24) 0.59 (0.39) 0.23 (0.15) 
Alzheimer’s Patients  0.32 (0.31) 0.57 (0.51) 0.24 (0.31) 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. FM = False Memory 
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